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Abstract 
A theory of cognition and an interdisciplinary research program so-called 
enactivism put forward by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch since their book 
titled: “The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience had 
been published in 1991. The theory and research program proposed in this 
book can be explicated in terms of eight significant themes including auto-
poiesis, sense-making, emergence, experience, embodied mind, embedded 
mind, enacted mind and the extended mind. This paper is an interpretation of 
the theory of enaction as a platform to educational research methodological 
reform. So it is argued that the non-reductionistic enactive approach is the 
promising arena for addressing educational research methodology so that 
circulation between first- and third-personal phenomena makes sense across 
a range of objective and subjective issues that mixed methodologists want to 
deal. 
Keywords: Neuro-phenomenology, theory of enaction, circular research method-
ology, educational phenomena and activity 
Introduction
Mixed methods research, as the third methodological movement (Creswell, 
2011, 273), had a rapid growth and became a formal methodology in a variety of 
discipline areas including psychology, education, and social science through the 
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2000s (Cameron, 2010). The main reasons for mixed methods could be concep-
tualized in:
Two types of considerations. The practical level, mixing the arguments related to the 
use of sampling, data collection, and data analysis techniques and the theoretical 
level, the reasons entail the pragmatic, the false duality and the warrant-through-tri-
angulation arguments. (Shabani Varaki et al., 2015, 28–29) 
However, mixed-methods opponents and proponents argued that both argu-
ments are controversial and problematic. They classified the crises in different 
ways: four levels of problems; “philosophical, cultural, psychological, and practical” 
(Mingers, 2001, 247), two-level of problems practical and paradigmatic (Shabani 
Varaki et al., 2015, 29) and “four major crises or challenges to mixed methods 
research: representation, legitimation, integration, and politics” (Onwuegbuzie and 
Collins, 2007, 282). Since several mixed-methods proponents argue “the problems 
are not insurmountable” (Mingers, 2001, 247), the opponents believe that we need 
to have an alternative to avoid the issues and the methodological trilingualism 
(Shabani Varaki et al., 2015). This paper will explore the alternative through the 
theory of enaction as a conceptual framework and methodology. Enactivism tends 
to cover the issues and challenges with the mixed method and replace trilingualism 
with unilingualism. Enaction theory will be explicated in terms of eight significant 
themes including autopoiesis, sense-making, emergence, experience, embodied 
mind, embedded mind, enacted mind and the extended mind. The paper con-
cludes with options for a non-reductionist, unbroken coincidence, amalgamated 
and an ecumenical approach to the world with an inter-subjective interaction; 
self-other co-determination; reciprocal causal interaction, non-linearity, beyond 
equilibrium.
Neuro-phenomenology: the origin of enaction
Neuro-phenomenology as a neuroscientific research program, in contrast to 
the neuro-philosophy and eliminativist position rooted in analytic philosophy 
(Churchland, 2002), has derived from the continental tradition of phenome-
nological philosophy, the particular phenomenology of Husserl’s philosophy 
(Varela, 1996). While neuro-philosophy wants to reduce mind into the brain, the 
neuro-phenomenology aims to recognize mind, brain, body and environment in 
the lineage of cognitive science and the Husserl’s phenomenological legacy for 
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direct experience (Rowlands, 2010). Therefore, this program invites us to consider 
both physiological and experiential data in every scientific study of cognition. 
Whereas the previous program tries to explain how the brain works in itself, neu-
ro-phenomenology tries to consider perception, emotion and all cognitive events 
associated with brain, body, and environment.
Furthermore, although neuro-phenomenology focuses on the rigor oriented 
investigation of cognition, it puts forward this idea that it is required to overcome 
the onlooker attitude about the experience. This account is phenomenological, 
which can provide an experiential validation for the rigor biological oriented 
examination and constrain the interpretation of empirical data (Lutz & Thomp-
son, 2003). Accordingly, the two domains of discourse (the physiological and the 
phenomenological) are circularly intertwined (Lutz, 2002). 
 
This approach is a unique synthesis of cutting-edge neurobiology, philosophy, and 
cognitive science that has implications for our understanding of human conscious-
ness. (Hallowell, 2009, 144)
Indeed, there are two crucial advances in the development of cognitive science: 
“the embodied turn” and “the interactive turn”. The embodied turn refers to the 
neurobiological, and the interactive turn refers to the social foundations of the 
enaction. Therefore, the enactive approach is a response to false dualisms “between 
brain and body” and “between individual and others” (Kyselo, 2014). Moreover, the 
embodied turn seeks to explain that cognition not just in the brain and no longer 
restricted to third-person operational descriptions, but in “the somatic contexts 
of the organism as a whole”. Therefore, enaction favours an embodied cognition 
to neural dynamics which embedded in “cycles of organismic regulation of the 
entire body; cycles of sensorimotor coupling between organism and environment; 
cycles of intersubjective interaction” (Lutz & Thompson, 2003, 41). Accordingly, 
neuro-phenomenology is an alternative approach which believes the controversy 
between reductionism and holism is false and the correct position is one that is 
similar to yin and yang, in Chinese philosophy, the two domains of explanation 
are complementary and amalgamated.
. 
Reductionism implies attention to a lower level, while holistic implies attention to 
a higher level. These are intertwined in any satisfactory description: and each entails 
some loss relative to our cognitive preferences, as well as some gain . . . there is no 
whole system without an interconnection of its parts, and there is no whole system 
without an environment. (Rudrauf et al., 2003, 40)
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Therefore, we need to set a comprehensive account to move towards credible 
knowledge about educational phenomena continually. In the following section, 
rooted in the neuro-phenomenology project, we scrutinize how the theory of 
enaction could be recognized as comprehensive view of educational research 
methodology.
Theory of Enaction: Major themes 
Theory of enaction is a new approach within the field of cognitive science focus-
ing on the ontological and epistemological underlying cognition and cognitive 
science which is presented by Maturana and Varela (1980) and Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch (2016). The theory is a departure point of representationalism and the 
computer model of cognition, and underlying cognitive science, phenomenology, 
and Buddhism, it focuses on “the continuity between life and mind” (Stewart et al., 
2010) as an alternative to overcome the Cartesian dualism. 
Enaction suggests a dynamic process of world-constitution that is always intimately 
linked to a particular bodily identity and situated within a greater field of interpen-
etrating relationships. (Malkemus, 2012, 201)
Thereupon Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (2016) emphasize that there is a sig-
nificant difference between the crystalline system such as the game of chess and 
the less well-defined domain like driving world. Although in the driving space we 
can recognize some discrete items in contrast with the game of chess the limits of 
this space are not clearly defined and so the driving world is strongly depended 
on both knowing-that (acquired skills) and knowing-how (the continuous use of 
non-specific background). In other words, Maturana and Varela (1987,26) believe 
that: “All doing is knowing, and all-knowing is doing”. Thus “the universal nature 
of doing in cognition” (Maturana and Varela, 1987, 28), indicates that there is no 
gap between knowing, being and acting. In this paper, we examine the framework 
in light of the eight intertwined key concepts:
Autopoiesis
Autopoiesis is a term invented by Maturana while talking with Varela and Jose 
Bulnes, to describe “the central feature of the organization of the living, which is 
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autonomy.” it is “a word that could mean what takes place in the dynamic of the 
autonomy proper to living system” (Maturana and Varela, 1980, xvii). Thompson 
(Thompson, 2005, 407–408) described the critical ideas of autopoiesis as follows: 
The first idea is that living beings are autonomous agents that actively generate 
and maintain their identities, and thereby enact or bring forth their own cognitive 
domains. 
The second idea is that the nervous system is an autonomous system: it actively 
generates and maintains its own coherent and meaningful patterns of activity … The 
nervous system does not process information in the computational sense but creates 
meaning. 
The third idea is that cognition is a form of embodied action. Cognitive structures 
and processes emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns of perception and action. 
Sensorimotor coupling between organism and environment modulates but does not 
determine, the formation of endogenous, dynamic patterns of neural activity, which 
in turn inform sensorimotor coupling.
The fourth idea is that a cognitive being’s world is not a pre-specified, external 
realm, represented internally by its brain, but a relational domain enacted or brought 
forth by that being’s autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment. 
Accordingly, the autopoietic system is a network characterized by a continuous 
interaction between its components. This interaction has two functions; the pro-
duction of the components and the existence of the system. In other words, when 
a property of a component in a system changes, other components upgrade their 
properties and keep the system alive. We believe that this idea links the enactive 
approach to educational research because both provide the same circumstances 
that cognition comes through a constitutive relation to the environment. In this 
respect, we argue that educational research is a dynamic study of the changing 
world, and it could be considered as a medium which is changing continuously. 
A researcher and researched will work all together as agents at the medium and 
super-complex system so-called autopoietic.
Sense-Making 
In a seminal article published in 1997, entitled “Patterns of life: Intertwining 
identity and cognition,” Varela stated the central idea of his theory of autonomy 
in the following way:
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I want to start by declaring that I think that understanding of organisms and the 
living is possible, that defining these terms in a satisfactory manner is not a utopian 
dream, and that we even have a good deal of the road already charted. However, this 
is under a fundamental condition: that the autonomy of the living is highlighted 
instead of forgotten, as it has been.
To highlight autonomy means essentially to put at center of the stage two interlinked 
propositions.
Proposition 1: Organisms are fundamentally a process of constitution of an identity.
Proposition 2: The organism’s emergent identity gives, logically and mechanistically, 
the point of reference for a domain of interactions. (Varela, 1997, 73)
He illustrated the two propositions in figure (1) and emphasized that they are 
complementary.
Accordingly, he believes that lived cognition is an activity that relies on an 
autopoietic system, a lived and survival organization that requires knowledge to 
make sense of its environment. He called this activity as “sense-making”. Indeed, 
for Varela, “notion of sense-making, assumes that the whole organism is a vehicle 
of meaning” (Stewart, Gapenne and Di Paolo, 2010, 147), and so “sense-making is 
also world-making”, because any organisms, including school, enact a world for its 



























Figure 1. The two key intertwined concepts to account for the autonomy 
of the living (Varela, 1997, 74)
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Emergence
Thompson (2007) argues that the theory of enaction is a  way of thinking 
about emergence. The dynamic co-emergence of cognition means that cognition 
emerges from the interaction between brain, body and environment.
“Dynamic co-emergence means that a whole not only arise from its parts, but 
the parts also arise from the whole. Parts and whole co-emerge and mutually 
specify each other. A whole cannot be reduced to its parts, for the parts cannot be 
characterized independently of the whole, conversely, the parts cannot be reduced 
to the whole, for the whole cannot be characterized independently of the parts”. 
(Thompson, 2007, 38)
Therefore, the central idea of emergence theory forms a background to define 
and explain educational activity as emergent phenomena which require an enac-
tive approach to educational research. 
The theory characterizes emergent phenomena by five significant properties, 
radical novelty, coherence, macro level, dynamical and ostensive; all these are 
demonstrated in the table (1):
Table 1. Five properties of emergent phenomena (Goldstein, 1999, 50).
Properties Meaning
radical novelty not previously observed 
not able to be anticipated in their full richness before they show them-
selves
not deducible from micro-level components
coherence appear as integrated wholes
spanning the separate micro-level components into a macro-level 
unity
macro-level the locus of emergent phenomena occurs at a global or macro level 
dynamical not pre-given wholes
associated with the arising of new attractors in a complex system
a system evolves over time
ostensive recognized by showing themselves
ostensibly recognized
Accordingly, Goldstein (1999) explains that the construct of emergence requires 
focusing on the across-system organization and an interplay between the parts and 
the whole to study complex or self-organization systems. Additionally, “emergence 
follow more of a continuum than a discrete jump from part to whole (Figure 2)”. 
(p. 50).
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The concept of “whole” in emergent phenomena defers from the idea of gestalt; 
“the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” (Ehrenfeld, 2008, 103). Gestalt 
is a non-dynamical idea that refers to a pre-given whole. However, emergence 
is a dynamic idea that is associate with the originating, not pre-given attractors. 
Indeed, emergence characterizes a quantitative and qualitative change by bifurcat-
ing a dynamic system.
Experience
The experience explained here comes from a holographic view of life. It is con-
nected with both first-person subjective data – Participants’ own consciousness 
– and third-person data – of the structure and function of the brain and body. 
Both kinds of data have “equal status in demanding full attention and respect for 
their specificity” (Varela, 1996, 343). Accordingly, experience “becomes a guiding 
force in a dialogue between phenomenology and science, resulting in an ongoing 
pragmatic circulation and mutual illumination between the two” (Stewart et al. 
2010, 43). Varela, Thompson and Rosch place this sense of experience at the center 
of enactive theory, methodologically. Furthermore, they introduce the phenome-
nological method into the experimental lab.
The new sciences of mind need to enlarge their horizon to encompass both lived 
human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human expe-
rience. Ordinary, everyday experience, on the other hand, must enlarge its horizon 
to benefit from the insights and analyses that are distinctly wrought by the sciences 
of mind. (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016, 15)
For enactive theory, the nature of direct experience is irreducible, ordinary, 
everyday, inter-subjectively available, and describable. Indeed, it is irreducible to 
components and avoids over-emphasizing any particular physical, mental, emo-
The parts alone or funconing
and properes of parts alone
The organizaon or configuraon
of parts in an emergent whole
Figure 2. Continuum of emergence explanations (Goldstein, 1999, 51)
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tional, collaborative, or other modality. So We need to invite all dimensions of 
experience to engage in the research process’s unfolding by addressing the interior 
and exterior.
Embodied Mind
Embodied mind, rooted in Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
works, means being connected to the body and at the same time the body influ-
ences the mind. The process of consciousness goes beyond the mere brain and is 
not confined to cortices. Although the brain is an integral part of the body, the 
mind has specific experiences of the world due to being in the body with a par-
ticular structure and function. In other words, the body, because of its structure 
and function, determines our experiences in the world.
Wilson and Foglia (2011) summarize four quotes from; McNeill 1992, O’Regan 
and Noë 2001, Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004 and Donald 1991) as evocative 
examples of phenomena; gesturing, visioning, using mirror neurons and perform-
ing cognitive tasks that have motivated embodied mind. 
“We typically gesture when we speak to one another, and gesturing facilitates not 
just communication but language processing itself (McNeill 1992). Vision is often 
action-guiding, and bodily movement and the feedback it generates are more tightly 
integrated into at least some visual processing than has been anticipated by tradi-
tional models of vision (O’Regan and Noë 2001). There are neurons, mirror neurons, 
that fire not only when we undertake an action, but do so when we observe others 
undertaking the same actions (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). We are often able to 
perform cognitive tasks, such as remembering, more effectively by using our bodies 
and even parts of our surrounding environments to off-load storage and simplify the 
nature of the cognitive processing”. (Donald 1991)
This idea is a refutation of Descartes’ when he claimed; “there is a great difference 
between a mind and a body in that a body, by its very nature, is always divisible. On 
the other hand, the mind is utterly indivisible (Descartes and Cress, 1998, 100–101)”. 
Therefore, by considering an example of the sense of hearing, we can explain that if 
we had another ear like a bat’s ear, we would hear and experience sound differently. 
The body creates a soft constraint on the nervous system so the mind cannot pro-
cess that information not transmitted by the form and raw material of the body, and 
the command of movement issued by the brain cannot be physically transferred to 
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the body. Therefore, perception depends on the body, located in a specific time and 
place. The mind, therefore, is not a Cartesian abstract object of thought. Physical 
and chemical processes are not merely cerebral, but consciousness in a body with 
specific capabilities recognizes the world around it and reveals the world to us 
through the body filter we have and the things we can do.
Embedded Mind
Embodiment means locality of the mind, and being in the body, embedded 
means locality of the body in terms of being in the world. For example, when we 
use the word “in” to say that water is “in” a glass, or that the color is “in” a can, “in” 
here means being and being in a pre-given body in another pre-given body, but 
there is no connection between the two. Nevertheless, using “in” to say the root 
is “in” the soil, or say that the body is the “in” the world, the two can no longer be 
separated. The root and soil are coexistent. The growth of a plant root affects the 
surrounding soil and vice versa. Both are the generic composition of the plant. 
Varela, Rosch and Thompson taking an example of color study, discussed the 
differences between Chicken position and egg position: by the Chicken position 
they mean “The world out there has pre-given properties. These exist prior to the 
image that is cast on the cognitive system, whose task is to recover them appropri-
ately (whether through symbols or global sub-symbolic states). By Egg position, 
they mean “The cognitive system projects its own world, and the apparent reality 
of this world is merely a reflection of internal laws of the system”. They explain 
that we should bypass the logical geography of inner versus outer, by embracing 
the middle of the two chicken and egg extremes. We have seen that colors are not 
“out there” independent of our perceptual and cognitive capacities. We have also 
seen that colors are not “in here” independent of our surrounding biological and 
cultural world. Contrary to the objectivist view, color categories are experiential; 
contrary to the subjectivist view, color categories belong to our shared biological 
and cultural world. Thus color as a study case enables us to appreciate the obvious 
point that chicken and egg, world and perceiver, specify each other ( Varela, Rosch 
and Thompson, 1993, 172)”.
Therefore, our experience of the educational activity has such an orientational 
structure not as the result of the objective direction of “out-there” and not as 
a  result of our cognitive system projection of in-here. Instead because of the 
golden mean position, understanding educational phenomena requires to appre-
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ciate the Scylla of cognition (recovering what is outer) and Charybdis of cognition 
(projecting what is inner) evolved together.
So embedded mind intertwined with the embodied mind. Embodiment 
requires to appreciate human body with its various sensorimotor capacities that 
are a significant source of their experience, and the sensorimotor capabilities are 
embedded in a more encompassing physical and cultural environment (Varela et 
al., 2016).
Enacted Mind
Enactive refers to an assumption that the mind depends on the activity of the 
agent. Moreover, the activity of the agent is done by filtering the body and within 
the capabilities of the body. 
A cognitive being’s world is not a pre-specified, external realm, represented internally 
by its brain, but a relational domain enacted or brought forth by that being’s auton-
omous agency and mode of coupling with the environment. (Thompson, 2005, 407)
So, the mind is in the body; the body is within the environment; the mind 
relates to the world through sensorimotor activities. That is, due to the recurrent 
sensorimotor activities concerning the world. These activities affect the world, the 
body, the mind and consciousness, and cognitive patterns. Indeed, the mind is 
formed by a recurrent sensorimotor pattern.
Cognitive structures and processes emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns of 
perception and action. (Thompson, 2005, 407)
The sense of sight is an example. It has been traditionally said that man is 
a passive creature whose visual stimulus strikes his eyes and is worked on by brain 
activity, and a command is issued that allows us to see that object. This process 
is only a small part of the operation of the mind, and there is also the reverse 
flow, that is, if there are no sensory-motor rules and movement and action and 
attention, we do not see anything. 
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Extended Mind
This idea was first proposed by Clark and Chalmers (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) 
in an article entitled “Expanded Mind.” They did not accept the demarcations of 
skin and skull, and so proposed an alternative so-called; active externalism. They 
argue that in driving cognitive processes, the environment has an active role.
“The human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. 
All the components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern 
behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we remove the 
external component, the system’s behavioral competence will drop, just as it would 
if we removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts 
equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head”. (Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998, 8–9)
The mind does not stop at the head or skin of the body. At the beginning of 
this article, they ask, where the mind stops and the world begins. To answer this 
question, they took an example of someone who has Alzheimer’s and the benefit 
of the booklet as a reminder. In this case, the pamphlet can be considered as part 
of the mechanisms of the brain. Therefore, the mind is not limited to the body, 
and cognition arises from the circular cooperation between mind, body and 
environment. 
In brief, enacted consists of “perceptually guided action” and “cognitive struc-
tures” emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be 
perceptually guided (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 2016, 173).
Final remark: macro strategies of the circular methodology
This paper is an interpretation of the theory of enaction as a platform to educa-
tional research methodological reform. So it is argued that the non-reductionistic 
enactive approach is the promising arena for addressing educational research 
methodology so that circulation between first- and third-personal phenomena 
makes sense across a range of objective and subjective issues that mixed meth-
odologists want to deal. Accordingly, we consider research method as a strategic 
framework consisting of macro and micro strategies. Macro strategies mean guid-
ing principles derived from the theory of enaction and micro strategies refer to 
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context-oriented issues related to research procedures. The strategic framework is 
consistent with our “para-quantitative methodology” (Shabani Varaki et al., 2015), 
and also has the potential to transcend the limitations of the quantitative mono 
method and qualitative mono method and the concept of pre-given Pushmi-pul-
lyu methodology with two approaches at opposing origins and ends, trying to mix 
two incommensurable methods. 
Thus, as shown in figure (3), we offer eight macro strategies to conceptualize the 
circular methodology derived from the theory of enaction as guiding principles, 
and a general plan, based on which researchers will be able to study an educational 
phenomenon using first-person, and third-person data together.
1. Autopoiesis; this strategy means that the researcher and the researched are 
parts of the autonomy dynamics proper to a living system. They are autono-
mous agents that actively generate and maintain their identities. Moreover, 
research methods are processes that emerge from recurrent sensorimotor 
patterns of perception and action which coupling between organism and 
environment modulates.
2. Sense-making; this strategy means that in virtue of  being autonomous 
agents, the researcher and the researched can be considered as sense-making 
systems. So they are practicing related to environment. Being-in-the-world 
that is entirely different from that of water being in a glass. Accordingly, 
research is a process of sense-making in interaction and a way to the emer-
gence of important information and human identity as well. Therefore, the 
whole organism (including the researcher/the researched) is a vehicle of 
meaning.
3. Emergence; this strategy involves five significant properties including radi-
cal novelty, coherence, macro level, dynamical and ostensive of educational 
phenomena. It requires focusing on the across-system organization and an 
interplay between the parts and the whole to study complex or self-organ-
ized systems.
4. Experience; this strategy intertwined with both first-person data - Partic-
ipants’ own consciousness – and third-person data - of the structure and 
function of the brain and body. So it requires to synthesize first-person 
data with experimental methodology in educational research. This strategy 
avoids over-emphasizing any particular physical, mental, emotional, collab-
orative, or other modality in educational research. 
5. Embodied mind; this strategy means being connected to the body, and at the 
same time, the body influences the mind. Although the brain is an integral 
part of the body, cognition is not confined to cortices. So we, as researchers, 
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should consider the contribution of the body with a particular structure and 
function to understand educational phenomena. 
6. Embedded mind; this strategy means locality of the body in terms of being 
in the world. It intertwined with the embodied mind. Embodiment requires 
to appreciate the human body with its various sensorimotor capacities that 
are a significant source of their experience, and the sensorimotor capabilities 
are embedded in a more encompassing physical and cultural environment. 
Therefore, educational research inspired by this strategy should be consid-
ered situational.
7. Enacted mind; this strategy refers to the activity of the agent, which is done 
by filtering the body. So, the mind is in the body; the body is within the 
environment; the mind relates to the world through sensorimotor activities. 
Through this strategy, educational researcher requires enlightened eyes to 
understand the educational world.
Figure 3. Macro-strategies 
of Research method inspired 
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8. Extended mind; this strategy means the possibility of cognitive extension. 
Therefore, the human mind extended throughout the living body and the 
world. As educational researchers, we need to consider the expanded cogni-
tive system, which is beyond the body’s boundary. The expanded cognitive 
system consists of the body, and everything (external to the body’s bound-
ary) has a function in the sense-making interaction with the environment.
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